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Pedro C. Abesa, Complainant, |
A.M. No. MTJ-05-1605 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-1690-MTJ] |
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Present: |
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PANGANIBAN, CJ.,
Chairperson, |
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- versus - |
*YNARES-SANTIAGO, |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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CALLEJO,
SR. and |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. |
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Judge Jose P. Nacional, |
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Municipal Trial Court, |
Promulgated: |
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Branch 1, |
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Respondent. |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is an administrative complaint[1]
dated
Complainant alleges that: he is the father of the late Pedro
Cornelio Jade Abesa who died in a vehicular accident
on December 6, 1999; he filed a criminal complaint for reckless imprudence
resulting to homicide against Hipolito Arlante, the driver of the vehicle which sideswiped his
son; the case was raffled to Branch 1 of the MTC, Naga
City, presided by respondent; after conducting an ocular inspection concerning
the case on January 14, 2005, in the presence of counsels and parties,
respondent directed complainant to see him at his chamber on January 19, 2005;
complainant together with his wife went to the chamber of respondent and found
out that they were the only ones being summoned; respondent discussed the
merits of the reckless imprudence case they filed and told them that the
evidence adduced by the prosecution is weak and is not sufficient to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, thus, implying the acquittal of
the accused; respondent even tried to impress upon the complainant that it was
his son who was at fault; he (complainant) was surprised at respondent’s
actuations and of his effort to convince him (complainant) to settle the case
with the accused and the latter’s employer in spite of the absence of the
latter; in so doing, respondent acted as the emissary, representative, and
counsel of the accused and the latter’s employer thereby demonstrating his bias
and partiality in favor of the defense; the conduct demonstrated by respondent
inside his chamber in trying to prejudice the outcome of the reckless
imprudence case and in trying to convince the complainant to settle a case in
the absence of the adverse party is a conduct unbecoming of a judge; such
conduct is reprehensible and tends to diminish the trust and confidence of the
litigants to the judicial system.
Complainant asked respondent to inhibit himself from acting
further on the case in the interest of justice and fairness.[2]
In his comment[3]
dated April 7, 2005, respondent avers that he told complainant and his wife
that he also lost a son in a vehicular accident and knew too well how
complainant felt losing their own son in the same manner; that when the ocular
inspection was conducted, both the prosecution and the defense have already
rested their case and he was then in the process of evaluating the evidences
and testimonies presented preparatory to making a judgment on the case, hence,
it is not right for complainant to claim that respondent had prejudged the case
against his son; that he told complainant that if he had to convict the
accused, the law requires that the conviction must be one that is beyond
reasonable doubt.
Respondent further states that complainant filed a civil
action for damages in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) involving the same
incident and he (respondent) knows fully well that complainant’s chances of
winning in the said case precisely depends on the outcome of the criminal case
pending in his sala; that, if he is to acquit the
accused, complainant may not get any compensation or civil indemnity whatsoever
in the RTC; that it is on this probability that he asked retired RTC Judge
Pedro Cruz (Atty. Cruz), counsel for the company that accused was working for,
whether they could extend financial help to the family of the victim, whatever
may be the outcome of the case pending before his sala
to which Atty. Cruz replied that he is willing to persuade his client about it;
that this is the reason why he (respondent) called complainant and his wife to
a conference in his chamber.
Respondent emphasizes that he had been in the judiciary for
23 years and had never been accused of corruption or incompetence; that complainant
was lying when he said that he (respondent) exerted effort to convince him to
settle the case with the accused because all that he (respondent) did was to
carefully explain his evaluation of the prosecution evidence and complainant’s
dilemma if the accused is acquitted in the criminal case; and that he had no
reason to be interested in forcing complainant to settle the case as he did not
know any of the parties.
Respondent asseverates that if his trying to help complainant
demonstrated a wrong impression to them, then he is very sorry and regrets that
he tried to help complainant; that after receiving a motion for his inhibition
filed by City Prosecutor Carlos Cortes, Jr., he immediately granted the motion
and sent the records of the case to the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC) for
re-raffle.
In his letter-reply[4]
dated May 12, 2005, complainant asserts that respondent, in his comment, had
already admitted in substance the commission of the act complained of – that of
calling complainant and his wife to respondent’s chambers and discussing the
merits of complainant’s case pending before respondent’s sala
without the presence of their counsel and of the adverse party, betraying his
partiality and violating his duty to be an honest and impartial judge.
Complainant maintains that even assuming that respondent’s
intention was to help, as a judge for 23 years, he must know that calling a
litigant into his chambers without the presence of counsel and the adverse
party would look very much suspicious as it was for him (complainant); that
respondent should have known better than to discuss the merits of a case with a
litigant alone in his chambers, more so if his purpose was to warn complainant
in advance of the outcome of the case; and that he (complainant) should have
known that such conduct, even to a person of unsuspecting mind, would look
highly questionable and irregular.
Complainant went further to say that respondent was clearly
and unequivocally lawyering for the accused when
respondent talked to him and his wife in his chambers; that respondent was
telling them of the probable outcome of the case because respondent wanted them
to agree to a very unfair settlement being offered to them in the civil case
for damages they filed in relation to the criminal case pending before
respondent’s sala; that respondent told them that
they should settle because he was going to acquit the accused and that he was
trying to use the probable acquittal as a leverage in trying to persuade them
into settling; that respondent’s bias became even more manifest when he
mentioned the amount which the accused and the other defendants in the civil
case are willing to pay as settlement.
Complainant then questioned how respondent knew the amount
the other parties are willing to give as settlement if he was not in prior
conference with the accused and the other defendant. Complainant claims that respondent admitted
as much when he said that he spoke to Atty. Cruz, a former judge in
Complainant argues that after 23 years in magisterial robe,
the respondent must know that even if he acquits the accused based on
reasonable doubt, there is still a high probability that complainant will
secure civil indemnity in a separate civil case. Hence, respondent’s claim that he was merely
acting out of pity was misplaced – nothing but a lame excuse for his improper
conduct. Complainant insists that
respondent has exceeded the boundaries of propriety and regularity with his
conduct in this matter; that he (respondent) acceded to complainant’s motion
for inhibition, far from showing his innocence, is in fact, a tacit admission
that respondent has pre-judged the case; and that respondent exhibited utmost
partiality and dishonesty, not only blatantly tried to subvert justice, he also
grossly violated his duty to protect the integrity of the judiciary.
In his letter-rejoinder[5]
dated May 25, 2005, respondent admits that when he called complainant and his
wife to a conference on January 19, 2005 to brief them on his evaluation of the
evidence, which he does not ordinarily do, he did not invite the lawyers and
the accused for the simple reason that he did not want to tell complainant and
his wife in the presence of the accused that their position was weak; that
conviction in criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt and in his
evaluation of the prosecution evidence, it did not pass that test; that
definitely, his intention in calling the complainant and his wife for a
conference was to enlighten them on their options based on his findings; that,
if it is true, as complainant suspects, that he was an emissary or that he was lawyering for the accused, he would not have bothered to
call complainant for a conference
because all that he could have done was just to render judgment on the
case based on his evaluation of the evidence – and leave the parties
alone.
Respondent denied that he was forcing a settlement on
complainant as the accused never came to him offering for any settlement; that
in fact, when he had the chance to talk to retired Judge Pedro Cruz (who
sometimes appear in his sala) knowing that Atty. Cruz
is the counsel for Benito Commercial (where accused is working) and he asked
Atty. Cruz if the latter’s client could extend financial help to the family of
complainant whatever maybe the outcome of the criminal case in his sala, Atty. Cruz readily said yes, provided the civil case
pending before the RTC is settled amicably at a reasonable amount.
Respondent ended by saying that he has nothing to gain in the
said case, financial or otherwise; that to his mind, complainant’s sense of
justice is only confined to the fact that he lost a son and the accused must
suffer for it, regardless of any circumstance; that perhaps, complainant is not
aware that cases are decided based on evidence and the rule of law – not on
emotions.
In the Resolution of
In a letter dated
In his letter of
In its Memorandum, the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) submitted its evaluation and recommendation, to wit:
EVALUATION: At
issue in the instant administrative case is the act of respondent judge of
summoning complainant and his wife to his chambers to discuss the merits of
Criminal Case No. 86302, in which herein complainant, Mr. Abesa,
is the private complainant, without the presence of both the latter’s counsel
and the adverse party.
The question to be
resolved then, is whether or not the aforementioned act of respondent judge
constitutes conduct unbecoming of a judge, making him administratively liable.
The 2002 Revised
Manual for Clerks of Court specifically cautions judges “to avoid in-chamber
sessions and to observe prudence at all times in their conduct to the end that
they do not only act impartially and with propriety but also perceived to be
impartial and proper” (Chapter VI, Letter E, 1.2.2.3).
Respondent Judge Nacional may have been motivated by noble intentions in
trying to persuade complainant and his wife to settle their case. However, the Code of Judicial Conduct
mandates that a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety
in all activities (Canon 2) and should behave at all times so as to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary (Rule
2.01).
It is in this light
that the Court frowns upon the holding by trial court judges of in-chamber
meetings with litigants or their counsels without the presence of the adverse
party.
Instead of taking
heed of this ethical prohibition, respondent judge readily admitted
transgressing it. Respondent judge
should have realized that his very conduct of summoning complainant to his
chamber without the presence of their counsel and of the party constitutes an
impropriety.
In addition to the
foregoing, it is improper and highly ethical for Judge Nacional
to suggest to a litigant what to do to resolve his case for such would generate
the suspicion that the judge is in collusion with one party. A litigant in a case is entitled to no less
than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
Judges are not only required to be impartial, but also to appear to be
so, for appearance is an essential manifestation of reality. Hence, not only must a judge render a just
decision, he is also duty bound to render it in a manner completely free from
suspicion as to its fairness and its integrity.
Respondent’s conduct in the instant case inevitably invites doubts about
respondent’s probity and integrity (Pascual vs. Bonifacio, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1625,
The Court cannot
emphasize enough the pivotal role lower court judges play in the promotion of
the people’s faith in the judiciary.
Unlike the appellate court justices, they are so-called “front-liners’
who give human face to the judicial branch at the “grassroots” level in their
interaction with litigants and those who do business with the courts. The admonition in Canon 2 that judges must
not only “avoid impropriety [but also] the appearance of impropriety” is more
sternly applied to them (Chan vs. Majaducon, etc. A.M. No. RTJ-02-1697,
In pending or
prospective litigations before them, judges should be scrupulously careful to
avoid anything that may tend to awaken the suspicion that their personal,
social or sundry relations could influence their objectivity. Not only must judges possess proficiency in
law, they must also act and behave in such manner that would assure litigants
and their counsel of the judges’ competence, integrity and independence (Molina
vs. Paz, etc., A.M. No. RTJ-01-1638,
RECOMMENDATIONS:
Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court is
our recommendation that Judge Jose P. Nacional, MTCC,
[sic] Br. 1, Naga City be FOUND GUILTY of
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and accordingly ADMONISHED
with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.[9]
We agree with the evaluation and recommendation of the OCA
except that respondent should be reprimanded and not simply admonished.
The Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
CANON 2 – A JUDGE
SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.
Rule
2.01. – A judge should
behave at all times so as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.
Respondent disregarded the Code of Judicial Conduct when he
readily admitted in no uncertain terms that he met with the complainant and his
wife and discussed the merits of the case pending before his sala without the presence of counsel and the adverse party;
and that he discussed with Atty. Cruz the possibility of extending financial
help to the family of complainant, whatever may be the outcome of the criminal
case in his (respondent’s) sala. Complainant had sufficient basis for his
perception that respondent acted as the emissary, representative and counsel of
the accused.
Assuming arguendo that respondent was moved out of pity for the
complainant, having also lost his (respondent’s) own son in a vehicular
accident, respondent should have known better than to ask Atty. Cruz, the
counsel for the company that accused was working for, to extend financial help
to the family of the victim. It is no
longer respondent’s concern whether the victim’s family shall receive any
compensation or civil indemnity in the civil action for damages pending before
the RTC. As respondent categorically
stated, justice is based on truth and the rule of law and not on emotions.
As complainant pointed out, in respondent’s 23 years in the
judiciary, he (respondent) must know that even if he acquits the accused based
on reasonable doubt, there is still a probability that complainant will secure
civil indemnity in the separate civil case.
Hence, respondent’s claim that he was merely acting out of pity does not
justify his improper conduct.
Respondent had exceeded the boundaries of propriety and
regularity. Respondent should have known
fully well that in every litigation, the manner and attitude of a judge are crucial to everyone
concerned.[10] It is not for him to indulge or even to give
the appearance of catering to the at-times human failing of yielding to first
impressions.[11] He is to refrain from reaching hasty
conclusions or prejudging matters.[12] It would be deplorable if he lays himself
open to the suspicion of reacting to feelings rather than to facts, of being
imprisoned in the net of his own sympathies and predilections.[13] His language, both written and
spoken, must be guarded and measured, lest the best intentions be misconstrued.
He should avoid such action as would
subject him to suspicion of interest in a case in his court.[14] It is of utmost importance that a judge must
preserve the trust and confidence reposed in him by the parties as an
impartial, unbiased and dispassionate dispenser of justice. When he conducts himself in a manner that
gives rise, fairly or unfairly, to perceptions of bias, such faith and
confidence are eroded. His decisions,
whether right or wrong, will always be under suspicion of irregularity.[15]
In the case of Adan v. Abucejo-Luzano[16] we
held that no matter how noble her intentions may have been, it was improper for
respondent therein to meet the accused privately without the presence of
complainant. Conversely, it is improper
for herein respondent to meet with the complainant and his wife to discuss the
merits of the case without the presence of the accused and his counsel no
matter how noble his intentions may have been.
We now come to the claim of respondent that in his 23 years
in the judiciary, he had never been accused of corruption or incompetence. This averment is contradicted by a Court
Resolution of
In this light, length of service is not a magic word that
once invoked will automatically be considered as a mitigating circumstance in
favor of the party invoking it. When an
officer or employee is disciplined, the object sought is not the punishment of
such officer or employee but the improvement of the public service and the
preservation of the public’s faith and confidence in the government.[19]
In Gallo v. Judge
Cordero,[20]
we imposed a fine of P10,000 on the respondent municipal judge not only
for impropriety in meeting with a litigant in his office but also for gross
ignorance of the law and procedure regarding the disposition of the criminal
complaint before him.[21] In the present case, respondent is not
charged with gross ignorance of the law and procedure; neither has it been
shown that he acted with malice or evil intent.
Thus, under the circumstances, the Court deems it appropriate to
reprimand respondent with a stern warning that the repetition of the same or
similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, Jose P. Nacional,
Presiding Judge,
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
(On leave)
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CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate
Justice |
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate
Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice
* On leave.
[1] Rollo, pp. 1-2.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] Castillo v. Juan, G.R. Nos. L-39516-17,
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Jugueta v. Boncaros,
A.M. No. 440-CFI,
[15] Ty v. Banco Filipino
Savings & Mortgage Bank, G.R.
Nos. 149797-98, February 13, 2004, 422 SCRA 649, 659.
[16] A.M. No. MTJ-00-1298,
[17] Rudy Prado v.
Judge Jose P. Nacional, for gross ignorance of
the law (for issuing a warrant of arrest without the requisite examination of
witnesses); dereliction of duty (for denying bail); partiality and oppression
(for issuing warrant of arrest without first requiring accused to file
counter-affidavits); and incompetence for issuing warrants of arrest (without
any finding that the same is needed in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice).
[18] Entitled Danilo Mariano v. Judge Jose P. Nacional.
[19] Civil Service Commission v. Cortez, G.R.
No. 155732,
[20] 315 Phil. 210 (1995).
[21]